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“UBER IN THE SKY,” while catchy, does not accuratelycapture the business models of Flytenow and AirPooler.
Instead, pilots would post to an online bulletin board on a semi-
private website, members would decide which flight to join
based on a common destination, and the pilot and each passen-
ger-member would pay a pro rata share of the expenses. This so-
called “flight-sharing” is not a new concept. In fact, the Federal
Administrative Agency (FAA) explicitly wrote private pilot flight-
sharing exceptions into its rules far before Uber or the Internet
were even conceived.1 It was, and still is, permissible for a private
pilot to fly others and charge a pro rata share of expenses under
FAA rules.2 So long as the fees charged merely cover costs, the
FAA has historically been permissive.
And Flytenow thought its business model fell squarely within
the blessing of this long-standing “expense-sharing exception”
for private pilots. However, there has always been a fine line be-
tween private flight, which may not be for profit, and commer-
cial flight, which implicates “common carrier” standards in
exchange for the ability to make a profit.3 The common carrier
line has been tested before. But recently, it was pushed past its
limits when this wave of start-ups moved the legal flight-sharing
model online.4
Flytenow and AirPooler utilized this relatively low-tech mash-
up of Craigslist and private flight until the FAA issued an opin-
ion that shut them down.5 Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals determined that the conglomeration of private pilots
was acting far outside the permissible scope of the pilots’ non-
commercial licenses. When the Supreme Court denied their pe-
tition for certiorari, it grounded—once and for all—Flytenow
and AirPooler’s flight-sharing operation. While the decision was
the correct application of law, the author worries about the
larger implications. In this comment, the author offers a more
developed analysis of relevant issues discussed in the D.C. Cir-
cuit opinion. This comment further opines on relevant adminis-
1 Private Pilot Privileges, 15 Fed. Reg. 5226, 5226 (Aug. 12, 1950) (final rules
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, pre-FAA, discussing expense-sharing exception to
general rule that private pilots cannot accept compensation in exchange for
flight).
2 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.113 (2016).
3 Id.; see generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.101–47.
4 See Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 886–88 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
5 FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from Mark W. Bury, Assistant Chief Counsel
for Int’l L., Legis., and Reg., to Rebecca MacPherson (Aug. 13, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter AirPooler Interpretation].
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trative law issues that, while not preserved in the Flytenow case,
currently carry with them a great deal of controversy.
First, this comment provides background and historical devel-
opment of the relevant law, focusing specifically on FAA rules,
regulations, and interpretation of expense-sharing as well as
common carriage.
Second, this comment turns to the background, history, and
recent developments in the Flytenow case. Namely, this comment
argues that the FAA correctly applied this existing law to
AirPooler and Flytenow in the respective interpretation letters.
The comment then fast-forwards to Flytenow, the case. There, the
D.C. Circuit justifiably affirmed the agency’s interpretation of
current statutes and regulations. While the FAA properly inter-
preted the law, Flytenow failed to properly preserve an argu-
ment for appeal and leaned far too heavily on its weaker “as
applied” and First Amendment challenges.
Third, this comment analyzes Flytenow as if the petitioner
would have preserved an Auer challenge to the validity of the
FAA’s interpretation of the word “common carriage.” In this al-
ternate universe, the Supreme Court may have granted Flyte-
now’s petition for writ of certiorari. But the hypothetical end
result likely would have been the same.
Fourth, this comment discusses current holes in administra-
tive law and its dangerous implications, using Flytenow as a test
balloon for more issues on the horizon with the recent eco-
nomic mutation to the so-called “sharing economy.” This com-
ment argues the current administrative infrastructure cannot
support this shift. And the problem is exacerbated by the lack of
clear direction on agency review standards for lower courts.
Flytenow and AirPooler were victims to this deadly cocktail, and
many more (in the aviation sector and beyond) will similarly
crash and burn if these deficiencies are not defused.
Finally, this comment briefly offers recommendations, both
for companies entering unchartered skies and for regulators just
trying to stay afloat. Current administrative regulations and law
resulted from a long, onerous process of regulation-making.
The time has come to run this course again.
In sum, administrative law remains highly disjunctive (and
perhaps too deferential) under Auer and its progeny at a time
where a whole new set of regulations will be necessary to come
remotely close to keeping up with changes in technology. While
a challenge is ripe for Supreme Court review, Flytenow was not
the proper vehicle. That the D.C. Circuit correctly upheld the
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FAA’s interpretation in Flytenow, however, does not lessen the
concern with the holding’s implications. By refusing to alter its
rules or adapt its interpretations to changing economic circum-
stances, the FAA diminished commercial certainty for compa-
nies like AirPooler and Flytenow. Indeed, Flytenow temporarily
grounded those trying to share the skies.
I. LEGAL BACKDROP
In the Federal Aviation Act, Congress granted the FAA au-
thority to “promote safe flight of civil aircraft.”6 Under that
charge, the FAA has the ability and duty to license pilots and
attach regulations to those licenses.7 To discharge its duty, the
FAA created multiple sets of complimentary regulations. Two
are relevant here: (1) Part 91 and 119 govern minimum flying
standards, depending on the nature of the operation as private
or commercial;8 and (2) other regulations, 14 C.F.R.
§§ 61.102–17; §§ 61.121–33, establish privileges and set limita-
tions on pilots based upon their “privilege” level.9
A. ALL AIRCRAFT UNDER PART 91 V. ONLY AIR CARRIERS UNDER
PART 119
First, Part 91 creates bare minimum standards that apply to
“all aircraft operating in the United States,” like seat belts, safe
altitudes, and speed.10 Conversely, Part 119, which is far more
stringent,11 creates an extensive list of minimum standards for
those who operate aircraft as “air carrier, commercial operator,
or both, in air commerce.”12 Among the heightened require-
ments, Part 119 mandates those who fall under one of the statu-
6 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) (2012).
7 Id. §§ 44701(b)(1), 44703(a), 44705.
8 See 14 C.F.R. § 119.1 (2016); 14 C.F.R. § 91.1 (2016).
9 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.102–17; 61.121–33.
10 Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see 14 C.F.R.
§§ 91.101–47.
11 Compare 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.103(g); 61.109(a)–(b); 61.56(a), (c) (outlining less
stringent requirements for private pilots operating solely under Part 91), with 14
C.F.R. §§ 135.243(a), (b)(1)–(2), (c)(1)–(2); 135.293 (requiring, inter alia, addi-
tional flight experience, heightened safety requirements, and increased intervals
of testing and checks for some Part 119 commercial pilots).
12 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 119.1 (outlining requirements to obtain a certificate);
121.1–121.1119 (detailing, in precise detail, operational requirements for com-
mercial aircrafts); 135.1–135.621 (detailing, in precise detail, operational re-
quirements for those commercial operations that also qualify as commuter
aircrafts); see also AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 2.
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tory categories obtain a certificate, ensuring compliance and
proper registration.13 Therefore, Part 119 fulfills the FAA’s statu-
tory obligation to issue certificates and regulate air carriers at a
higher level of scrutiny.14
Nevertheless, Congress and the FAA—perhaps intention-
ally—left gaps in the statutory and regulatory framework.15 For
example, Congress defines the first category of operations that
need a Part 119 certificate, “air carrier,” in the Federal Aviation
Act. Air carrier means a “[person] undertaking by any means,
directly or indirectly, to provide air transportation,”16 which in-
cludes those engaged in “interstate air transportation” and “air
commerce.”17 In the statute, Congress defines “interstate air
transportation” as “the transportation of passengers or property
by aircraft as a common carrier for compensation . . . .”18 And it de-
fines, somewhat circularly, “air commerce” as including “ . . .
interstate air commerce, . . . the operation of aircraft within the
limits of a Federal airway, or the operation of aircraft that di-
13 See 14 C.F.R. § 119.1. A Part 119 certificate is also required in other situa-
tions that are outside the scope of this article. For example, when an aircraft’s
seat capacity exceeds 19 passengers or maximum weight-load exceeds 6,000
pounds. Id. However, these provisions are outside the scope of this article, as the
FAA conceded in its interpretation letter that neither AirPooler nor Flytenow
implicated the provisions with the proposed business models. See AirPooler Inter-
pretation, supra note 5.
14 49 U.S.C. §§ 44705 (2012) (the FAA “shall issue an air carrier operating cer-
tificate to a person desiring to operate as an air carrier when the Administrator
finds . . . that the person properly and adequately is equipped and able to oper-
ate safely . . . . [The] certificate shall – (1) contain terms necessary to ensure
safety . . . ; and (2) specify the places to and from which, and the airways of the
United States over which, a person may operate as an air carrier”); 44711(a)(4)
(“(a) A person may not . . . (4) operate as an air carrier without an air carrier
operating certificate or in violation of a term of the certificate”).
15 See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a); 14 C.F.R. § 119.1; see also Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (“[W]here Congress includes particular lan-
guage in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclu-
sion or exclusion”); Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 79 (1990) (“In casual
conversation, perhaps, such absentminded duplication and omission are possi-
ble, but Congress is not presumed to draft its laws that way.”); Montclair v. Rams-
dell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (establishing that the rule in which courts “give
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any
construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of
the language it employed” is engrained in American statutory interpretation).
16 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (2012).
17 Id. § 40102(a)(3), (5).
18 Id. § 40102(a)(25) (emphasis added).
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rectly affects, or may endanger safety in, foreign or interstate air
commerce.”19
In addition, the FAA regulations define the second category
of operations that require a Part 119 certificate (i.e., “commer-
cial operator”).20 There, commercial operator means a “person
who, for compensation or hire, engages in the carriage by aircraft in
air commerce of persons or property, other than as an air car-
rier or foreign air carrier . . . .”21 In sum, under the complex,
interwoven statutory and regulatory scheme established by Con-
gress and the FAA, an operation must obtain a Part 119 certifi-
cate when it acts as either: (1) a common carrier that accepts
compensation for carrying persons or property; or (2) a person
who carries persons or property, in air commerce, for compen-
sation or hire.22
However, “common carriage” and “compensation” are not de-
fined in § 40102, in the remainder of the Federal Aviation Act,
nor anywhere in FAA regulations.23 Instead, the FAA created a
distinction between private carriage and common carriage in a
1986 Advisory Circular.24 Under the standard outlined in that
circular, an operation engages in “common carriage” when it
satisfies four elements: “(1) a holding out of a willingness to (2)
transport persons or property (3) from place to place (4) for
compensation.”25 Nevertheless, the FAA left open the meaning
of “compensation.”
Certainly, the stringent requirements in Part 119 govern tradi-
tional commercial airlines, like Southwest and American Air-
lines, under either the statutory definition of “air carrier” or the
regulatory definition of “commercial operator.”26 These ven-
tures exist to transport large groups of passengers and property
to make a profit.27 But not all Part 119 classifications are so cut
and dried.28 Rather, much litigation, including Flytenow, revolves
around who is a common carrier and when an entity acts as a
19 Id. § 40102(a)(3).
20 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2016).
21 Id. (emphasis added).
22 See id.; 14 C.F.R. § 119.1; 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a).
23 See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a).
24 FAA Advisory Circular 120-12A (Apr. 26, 1986), J.A. 30–32.
25 Id. ¶ 4, J.A. 30.
26 See 14 C.F.R. § 119.1(a); 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a); 14 C.F.R. § 1.1.
27 See 14 C.F.R. § 119.1(a).
28 See id.; see, e.g., Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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common carrier29 as well as what constitutes compensation.30
Likewise, much litigation turns on the distinction between classi-
fication as private or commercial pilot.31
B. PRIVATE V. COMMERCIAL PILOT
Second, interrelatedly yet separately to the Part 91-Part 119
dichotomy, FAA regulations distinguish between private and
commercial pilots.32 Most importantly, while commercial pilots
may carry passengers or property for compensation or profit, it
is well-established that private pilots generally may not.33 In-
deed, private pilots (like all pilots) must comply with Part 91
aircraft regulations.34 But they may not act as “air carriers” with-
out also implicating the Part 119 requirements.35 In addition,
per § 61.113, private pilots may not transport persons or prop-
erty for compensation or hire.36
Doing so could implicate two separate but related violations:
(1) if a private pilot acts without a Part 119 certificate and ac-
cepts compensation, she violates § 61.113;37 and (2) if that same
pilot acts as a common carrier or implicates the “commercial
operator” definition in 14 C.F.R. § 1.1, she violates not only
§ 61.113 but also Part 91, Part 119, and the Federal Aviation
Act.38 Such a violation could result in serious consequences, in-
29 See, e.g., Woolsey v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 993 F.2d 516, 523–24 (5th Cir.
1993).
30 See Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 885–86.
31 See id. at 886.
32 Compare 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.102–17 (outlining requirements, rules, privileges,
and limitations on private pilots), with §§ 61.121–33 (outlining same for commer-
cial pilots).
33 Compare 14 C.F.R. § 61.113(a) (“[e]xcept as provided in paragraphs (b)
through (h) . . . no person who holds a private pilot certificate may act as pilot in
command of an aircraft that is carrying passengers or property for compensation or
hire”) (emphasis added), with § 61.133(a)(1)(i) (“[p]rivileges— . . . A person
who holds a commercial pilot certificate may act as pilot in command of an aircraft
. . . [c]arrying persons or property for compensation or hire . . .”) (emphasis
added).
34 14 C.F.R. § 91.101.
35 Id. § 119.1; see also 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a); 14 C.F.R. § 1.1.
36 14 C.F.R. § 61.113(a) (“[N]o person who holds a private pilot certificate
may act as pilot in command of an aircraft that is carrying passengers or property
for compensation or hire; nor may that person, for compensation or hire, act as
pilot in command of an aircraft.”).
37 Id.
38 Id.; 14 C.F.R. § 119.1; 49 U.S.C. § 44711(a)(4).
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cluding massive civil penalties39 and potential criminal action.40
It helps to conceptualize the former violation as exceeding pri-
vate privileges (akin to stepping outside of bounds) and the lat-
ter as commercially operating without a certificate (akin to an
amateur spectator jumping on the field to play professional
football).41
C. FILING THE GAPS: COMPENSATION EXCEPTIONS V.
EXEMPTIONS
While compensation is not defined in the scheme, the FAA
uses the term throughout its regulations. Of note, the FAA
adopted several tests that help determine when compensation
exists, does not exist, or exists but is excepted.42 First, the FAA
sought to clarify its definition of commercial carrier for pur-
poses of the Part 91-Part 119 dichotomy.43 “Where it is doubtful
that an operation is for ‘compensation or hire’, the test applied
is whether the carriage by air is merely incidental to the person’s
other business or is, in itself, a major enterprise for profit.”44
Second, the FAA crafted a list of “exceptions” (or “exemp-
tions”)45 to the general limitations on private pilots receiving
compensation.46 Of particular relevance here, under
§ 61.113(c), a private pilot may accept a “pro rata share of the
operating expenses of a flight with passengers, provided the ex-
39 49 U.S.C. § 46301(a) (“(1) A person is liable to the United States Govern-
ment for a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 (or $1,100 if the person is an
individual or small business concern) for violating – (A) . . . chapter 447 [certifi-
cate procurement requirements] . . . (2) A separate violation occurs . . . for each
day the violation . . . continues or, if applicable, for each flight involving the viola-
tion”) (emphasis added).
40 Id. § 46317 (“(a) General criminal penalty – An individual shall be fined . . .
or imprisoned for not more than 3 years, or both, if that individual . . . (1) know-
ingly and willfully serves or attempts to serve in any capacity as an airman operat-
ing an aircraft in air transportation without an airman’s certificate authorizing
the individual to serve in that capacity; or (2) knowingly and willfully employs for
service or uses in any capacity as an airman to operate an aircraft in air transpor-
tation an individual who does not have an airman’s certificate authorizing the
individual to serve in that capacity.”).
41 See generally AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1–2.
42 See, e.g., id. at 2 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 1.1).
43 See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1.
44 Id. (emphasis added).
45 Rebecca MacPherson, Can’t Get No Compensation: FAA’s Interpretation of Ex-
pense Sharing, 29 No. 1 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 20–21 (2016) (arguing that the ex-
pense-sharing rule under § 61.113 was, is, and always has been an exemption
rather than an exception).
46 14 C.F.R. § 61.113(a).
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penses involve only fuel, oil, airport expenditures, or rental
fees.”47 If, however, the pilot accepts any compensation above a
pro rata share, she “violate[s] the limits of the expense-sharing
exception” and risks crossing the threshold from private to com-
mercial.48 Further, the pilot can only receive pro rata expenses
from a passenger if the two share a “bona fide common pur-
pose.”49 This requirement ensures that pilots are not using pro
rata expense-sharing as a pretext to serve as a glorified taxi cab.
By limiting expense-sharing to situations in which the pilot and
passenger have a “common purpose,” the FAA protects the un-
derlying rationale of § 61.113 of merely offsetting rather than
compensating.50 But that line is blurry.
Take, for example, a sole pilot who owns and operates a two-
seater airplane. He clearly does not operate a large-scale com-
mercial operation. Nor would he appear to be a commercial op-
erator under the traditional understanding of the phrase.51
However, assume he accepts a “free” night in a hotel in ex-
change for moving a friend from Point A to Point B, a place
where he was already planning to go.52 The statutory and regula-
47 Id. § 61.113(c).
48 See AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 2.
49 FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from Rebecca B. MacPherson, Assistant
Chief Counsel for Reg., to Ronald R. Lamb (Mar. 10, 2010) (“[t]he FAA has
consistently interpreted this exception [under § 61.113(c)] to require a pilot to
share with his passengers a bona fide common purpose for conducting the
flight”) [hereinafter Lamb Interpretation]; FAA Legal Interpretation Memoran-
dum from Rebecca B. MacPherson, Assistant Chief Counsel for Reg., to Don
Bobertz (May 18, 2009) (“Absent a bona fide common purpose for their travel,
reimbursement for the pro rata share of operating expenses constitutes compen-
sation and the flights would be considered a commercial operation for which a
part 119 certificate is required. Whether a bona fide common purpose exists de-
pends upon the facts of the situation at hand.”) (citation omitted) [hereinafter
Bobertz Interpretation]; see also FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from Rebecca B.
MacPherson, Assistant Chief Counsel for Reg., to Peter Bunce (Nov. 19, 2008)
[hereinafter Bunce Interpretation].
50 “[I]f pilots pay less, they would not just be sharing expenses but would actu-
ally be flying for compensation or hire.” 62 Fed. Reg. 16,220, 16,263 (Apr. 4,
1997); see also FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from Rebecca B. MacPherson, As-
sistant Chief Counsel for Reg., to Guy Mangiamele (Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter
Mangiamele Interpretation].
51 Cf. Lamb Interpretation, supra note 49 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 119.1 and finding
that a pilot who flew physicians and accepted full reimbursement in return was a
“commercial operation” that required a Part 119 certificate).
52 See FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from Rebecca MacPherson, Assistant
Chief Counsel for Reg., to Mike Sommer (Oct. 8, 2010) (determining that provi-
sion of a “free dinner” in exchange for flying a passenger constitutes compensa-
tion) [hereinafter Sommer Interpretation].
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tory scheme itself offers little certainty to that pilot as to (1)
whether he has either stepped outside the limitations of his pri-
vate pilot license, violating section 61 rules; or (2) whether he
should have procured a Part 119 certificate under the statutory
definition of an air carrier or regulatory definition of a commer-
cial operator.53 To be sure, under the current interpretation of
“compensation,” our hypothetical pilot with the two-seater likely
exceeded his license (stepped outside of bounds) and engaged
in impermissible commercial operation (jumped onto the
field).54
Adding to the confusion, there is currently a debate as to
whether § 61.113(c) outlines exemptions or exceptions.55 The
distinction has reaching consequences. If the list outlines exemp-
tions, then the pro rata payment is not compensation—ever. Not
for purposes of Title 14, Part 61, and not for purposes of com-
mon carrier analysis.56 And under this view, the pilot who ac-
cepts pro rata payment has not actually accepted compensation.
If it lists exceptions, then pro rata payment is compensation, but
the FAA considers that compensation excluded from private pi-
lot limitations under § 61.113(a). Pro rata payments would still
qualify as “compensation” for other purposes, like satisfying a
prong of the common carriage standard. Under this interpreta-
tion, a pilot could accept pro rata payment as compensation
without a Part 119 certificate only if the operation did not in-
volve common carriage.57 But if this pilot engaged in “common
carriage,” the § 61.113(c) compensation exceptions would be-
come moot.58 Regardless of whether the compensation received
was de minimis or only a pro rata share of the expenses, this pilot
would be considered an “air carrier” under the “exceptions”
53 See, e.g., Petitioner’s Opening Brief, at *21–22, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808
F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 66004 (Jan. 5, 2015). But see
AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1.
54 Sommer Interpretation, supra note 52 (determining that provision of a “free
dinner” in exchange for flying a passenger constitutes compensation).
55 Compare MacPherson, supra note 45, at 20, with FAA Legal Interpretation
Letter from Mark W. Bury, Assistant Chief Counsel for Int’l L., Legis., and Reg.,
to Andy Dobis (May 21, 2014) (“[C]ompensation under the FAA’s view is the
receipt of anything of value, including the receipt and use of donated funds . . . for
piloting services.”) (emphasis added).
56 MacPherson, supra note 45, at 22–23 (advocating for exemptions view de-
spite growing trend in FAA interpretations to the contrary).
57 See Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 886; see also Mangiamele Interpretation, supra note
50.
58 See AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 2.
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view.59 In that situation, the pilot could still accept pro rata pay-
ment as compensation, but only as a common carrier and in
compliance with Part 119 and other requirements of commer-
cial operation.60 Thus, an “exceptions” view casts a wider doctri-
nal net.
If simply reading about the regulatory schemes seems confus-
ing, imagine how an emerging company felt when trying to op-
erate under them. This is the tapestry with which Flytenow and
AirPooler had to work. And one in which they failed to properly
navigate. Complicated or not, the FAA acted predictably in Flyte-
now under its statutory and regulatory scheme. It merely ex-
tended an existing trend of broadly reading compensation and
applied it to a new situation. The D.C. Court of Appeals, thus,
correctly upheld the FAA’s interpretation.
II. FLYTENOW, INC. V. FAA
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Flytenow attempted to capitalize on the so-called “expense-
sharing rule” under § 61.113(c).61 Under the Flytenow model,
private pilots could connect with passengers to fill unused seats
in their planes. To do so, pilots signed up at Flytenow.com,
thereby agreeing to a background and license check.62 Then,
pilots would post their open seats on, what Flytenow dubbed, an
“online bulletin board.”63 The site required the pilots input
date, time, and locations.64 Most, if not all, of Flytenow pilots
had private pilot licenses, and Flytenow itself did not own an
inventory of planes.65 Thus, the company attempted to distin-
guish its model from commercial charter operations, many of
59 See id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (defining “air carrier” as a “[person]
undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air transportation”);
§ 40102(a)(25) (defining “interstate air transportation” as “the transportation of
passengers or property by aircraft as [a] a common carrier [b] for compensation”)
(emphasis added).
60 Compare 14 C.F.R. § 61.113(a), with 14 C.F.R. § 61.133(a)(1).
61 Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 885–86, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
62 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *3, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL 69183
(U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 3564280 (June 24, 2016).
63 Id. at *3, *5.
64 FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from Mark W. Bury, Acting Assistant Chief
Counsel for Int’l L., Legis., and Reg. Div., to Gregory S. Winton (Aug. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter Flytenow Interpretation].
65 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *3–4, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL
69183 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 3564280 (June 24, 2016).
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which are passenger-centric and hold their own plane
inventory.66
Members, who consisted mainly of flight enthusiasts and
other pilots, would also register online and “‘select an Aviation
Adventure for which he or she has a bona fide common pur-
pose’ and request to participate in the planned Aviation Adven-
ture.”67 Multiple members could join in on the same ride,
assuming the pilot had space.68 Once the pilot accepted the
flight with one or multiple members, the member(s) plus the
pilot would each pay a pro rata share of the operating ex-
penses.69 Flytenow also took a prorated commission.70 In an at-
tempt to comply with the expense-sharing rule in § 61.113,
Flytenow forbid pilots from making a profit or even contributing
less than their pro rata share.71
Like Uber, pilots were in control of accepting or denying
rides.72 Pilots could also cancel at any time for any or no rea-
son.73 And passengers who were concerned or curious could ac-
cess a pilot’s background, license information, and other
personal details before deciding to fly with that pilot.74 Unlike
Uber, passengers were never in control of the ultimate location
of the trip; rather, their interest was either recreational or to
travel to the same location as the pilot.75 Therefore, Flytenow
66 See id. at *4. But see generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 135.1–135.621 (describing detailed
requirements for service as a commercial charter operation).
67 Flytenow Interpretation, supra note 64, at 1. Flytenow’s companion,
AirPooler, described the service as “a peer-to-peer general aviation flight sharing
company that has developed an internet-based discovery platform that allows pri-
vate pilots to offer available space on flights that they are intending to take[.]”
AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1 (alteration in original).
68 Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
69 Id.
70 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *4, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL 69183
(U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 3564280 (June 24, 2016).
71 Marcia Coyle, ‘Uber of the Sky,’ Challenging the FAA, Gets Business Backing in
SCOTUS, LAW.COM (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/08/
09/uber-of-the-sky-challenging-the-faa-gets-business-backing-in-scotus/?slreturn=
20170108193121.
72 Flytenow Interpretation, supra note 64, at 1.
73 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *3, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL 69183
(U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 3564280 (June 24, 2016).
74 Id. at *4. In its petition, Flytenow argued that the service actually offered a
higher degree of safety than some commercial carriers. When a passenger books a
flight through American Airlines, for example, there is no information about the
pilot himself. But Flytenow allowed members to browse pilot profiles before
agreeing to an arrangement. Id.
75 See id. at *3–4.
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asserted, and the FAA did not dispute, passengers and pilots al-
ways shared a bona fide common purpose.76 Further differenti-
ating itself from Uber, Flytenow created a platform that was non-
public and only accessible to pilots and members.77
B. THE FAA LEGAL INTERPRETATION
Due to the growing success of the business model, Flytenow
and AirPooler asked the FAA for a legal interpretation per judi-
cial review procedure prescribed in the overarching regulatory
scheme for administrative law, the Administrative Procedure
Act.78 Relying on its standard for common carriage and its inter-
pretation of administrative rules, the FAA determined Flytenow
and its pilots were operating beyond the scope of their private
pilot licenses without complying with the additional standards
required to run such an operation.79 Specifically, the FAA out-
lined and applied the legal background discussed above.80
First, the FAA settled the dispute on expense-sharing under
§ 61.113(c) and determined that pro rata payment constitutes
an “exception.”81 In other words, payment, even if pro rata and
solely as a reimbursement of costs, is compensation nonethe-
less.82 In so doing, the FAA affirmed what Flytenow and others
should have already recognized—that the modern FAA’s view
construes compensation broadly.83 Somewhat ironically, Flyte-
now grasped at straws to find a definition of “compensation”
precisely because the FAA failed to clearly define it previously.84
The FAA then rejected Flytenow’s proposed “enterprise for
76 Id. at *5; Flytenow Interpretation, supra note 64, at 1.
77 See Flytenow Interpretation, supra note 64, at 1.
78 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
79 AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 4; Flytenow Interpretation, supra
note 64, at 1.
80 See AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1–3.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 3 (determining that, when a pilot accepts pro rata expenses under
§ 61.113(c), “the issue of compensation is not in doubt”).
83 See FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from Rebecca MacPherson, Assistant
Chief Counsel for Reg., to Mark Haberkorn, at 2, n.1 (Oct. 3, 2011) (“any reim-
bursement of expenses, including a pro rata share of operating expenses, constitutes
compensation”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Haberkorn Interpretation];
Bobertz Interpretation, supra note 49, at 2–3; Mangiamele Interpretation, supra
note 50, at 1; Bunce Interpretation, supra note 49, at 1; Clarification of Private
Pilot Privileges, 28 Fed. Reg. 8157 (Aug. 8, 1963) (clarifying that expense sharing
is compensation but a recognized exception to general prohibition on private
pilots and compensation).
84 But see AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 3.
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profit” test, shooting down Flytenow’s attempt to bootstrap the
language from 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 into a test for compensation. Ac-
cordingly, the FAA correctly stuck to its modern definition, that
compensation under the FAA’s view is “the receipt of anything
of value.”85
Nevertheless, it should be noted that simply flying an aircraft
with a private license while accepting pro rata expenses still does
not (without more) go outside the limitations on private pi-
lots.86 Pro rata payment only constitutes compensation, which a
private pilot can accept under the § 61.113 exception if her op-
eration does not run afoul of other regulations. In other words,
there must be something more than pro rata excepted compen-
sation for a violation.
Second, the FAA found that something more in Flytenow’s
operation as a common carrier.87 Of the four elements of com-
mon carriage, Flytenow only disputed two: compensation and
holding out.88 Because the FAA determined expense-sharing
under § 61.113(c) is compensation, regardless of its excepted
quality, the FAA easily disposed of that line of argument in its
interpretation.89 In fact, the FAA cited to a notice of proposed
rulemaking from 1967 to support the contention that this view
is, has, and will continue to be the view of the FAA regarding the
exemption versus exception debate.90
85 FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from Mark W. Bury, Assistant Chief for Int’l
L., Leg., and Reg., to Jeffery J. Reich, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2013) (“Regarding the defini-
tion of compensation, the FAA has continually maintained a long[-]standing pol-
icy that defines compensation in very broad terms. It does not require profit, a
profit motive, or the actual payment of funds.”) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted) [hereinafter Reich Interpretation]; see also FAA Legal Interpretation
Letter from Mark W. Bury, Acting Assistant Chief Counsel for Int’l L., Legis. and
Reg., to Robert P. Silverberg, at 2 (July 2, 2013) (citing FAA Legal Interpretation
Letter from Rebecca B. Macpherson, Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations, to
Alan M. Dias (Dec. 19, 2011); FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from Rebecca B.
MacPherson, Assistant Chief Counsel for Reg., to Joseph A. Kirwan, at 2 (May 27,
2005) (defining expense sharing for charitable medical flights as “compensa-
tion,” and considering the operation a “commercial operation” that required a
Part 119 certificate).
86 Cf. MacPherson, supra note 45, at 20–22 (expressing concern that the Flyte-
now holding could lead to such a result).
87 AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 2–4; Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808
F.3d 882, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
88 AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 3–4; FAA Advisory Circular 120-
12A (Apr. 26, 1986), ¶ 3–4, J.A. 30.
89 AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 3.
90 Id. (quoting Clarification of Private Pilot Privilege, 28 Fed. Reg. 8157 (Aug.
8, 1963)) (opining that “[t]he ordinary meaning of ‘compensation’ includes the
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Next, the FAA applied a literal standard to determine that
Flytenow was “holding out.”91 Because Flytenow pilots posted on
a common website, the FAA determined that they held them-
selves out to the public as available to transport from Point A to
Point B.92 Flytenow and Airpooler argued that the pilot and pas-
senger shared a common destination and purpose, so their pi-
lots did not hold themselves out. Regardless, the FAA took issue
with how Flytenow pilots obtained passengers as opposed to why
they did.93
Thus, the FAA seemed primarily worried about the opera-
tion’s manner rather than its asserted motivation. Perhaps most
indicative, the FAA cited to previous attempts at similar opera-
tions to the Flytenow model.94 While the internet developed
rather recently, the desire to offset expenses (and to take advan-
tage of the exception) has been around since the development
of the expense-sharing rule.95 Indeed, at least one similar opera-
tion from the 1970s also took the form of a “membership
club.”96 There, the requested legal interpretation letter opined
on the legality of a club-styled venture named “Share-A-Flite.”
The club sent copy of the membership card, welcome letter, and
membership agreement to the FAA, which ultimately deter-
mined that the rudimentary flight-sharing program stretched
the expense-sharing exception past its intended application.97
Despite the obvious difference between an enterprise from the
1970s and a modern Internet enterprise, the similarities be-
tween the “Share-A-Flite” scheme and Flytenow are striking.
Both attempted to capitalize on the expense-sharing rule with a
act of making up for whatever has been suffered or lost through another, and the
act of remuneration”). According to this proposed rule, despite the propriety of
expense-sharing as a “traditional right,” the act of receiving pro rata reimburse-
ment still falls squarely within that definition of “compensation.” 28 Fed. Reg.
8157.
91 AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 4; FAA Advisory Circular 120-12A
(Apr. 26, 1986), ¶¶ 4a–e, J.A. 30–31.
92 AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 4; see FAA Advisory Circular 120-
12A (Apr. 26, 1986), ¶¶ 4a–e, J.A. 30–31.
93 See AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 4.
94 Id. (citing, inter alia, FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from DeWitte Lawson,
Regional Counsel, to D. David Brown (Apr. 16, 1976) [hereinafter Brown
Interpretation]).
95 See Brown Interpretation, supra note 94; FAA Legal Interpretation Letter
from John H. Cassidy, Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations and Enforcement Di-
vision, to Thomas Chero (Dec. 26, 1985).
96 Brown Interpretation, supra note 94.
97 Id.
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semi-public offering of transportation services by private pilots
not licensed to offer them. There, as it did in Flytenow, the FAA
expressed concern with the attendant legal implications of al-
lowing private pilots to hold themselves out in such a manner.
Further, both interpretations memorialize the FAA’s extreme re-
luctance to interpret expense-sharing as anything more than a
narrow exception.98
C. WHY THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT GOT IT RIGHT
Flytenow and AirPooler challenged the FAA interpretation in
the D.C. Circuit, which consolidated the judicial review proceed-
ings, and ultimately upheld the FAA’s letter as a final order.99
On appeal, Flytenow’s argument was two-fold. However, neither
argument carries much water. First, Flytenow asserted that the
FAA “misinterpreted” its own standard for compensation, focus-
ing largely on the exemption-versus-exception dichotomy.100
Further, Flytenow argued that compensation cannot exist when
the pilot and passenger share a common purpose.101 Second,
Flytenow argued that, even if it did meet compensation, it could
not be common carrier.102 According to Flytenow’s requested
definition, holding out must involve some form of active market-
ing. And here, Flytenow argued that if anything is passive market-
ing, posting on a site and walking away certainly is.103
In a reply brief, Flytenow also criticized the FAA’s use of an
antiquated definition that, despite thirty years of ability to do so,
the FAA never codified in its rules.104 As a conglomerate of pri-
vate pilots governed by Part 91, Flytenow argued that its pilots
should have been able to operate under the expense-sharing ex-
ception.105 In sum, because Flytenow pilots only accepted pro
rata reimbursement and merely posted flights on an online bul-
letin board, Flytenow maintained that a Part 119 certificate was
not required.106 The D.C. Circuit vehemently disagreed and
98 See id.; Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
99 Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 885.
100 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at *19, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 886
(D.C. Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 66004 (Jan. 5, 2015).
101 Id. at *19–20.
102 Id. at *21–26.
103 See id. at *24–25.
104 Petitioner’s Reply Brief at *9, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 1569752 (Apr. 8, 2015).
105 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at *19, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 886
(D.C. Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 66004 (Jan. 5, 2015).
106 Id.
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sided with the FAA without even resorting to a controversial
agency deference analysis.107
1. Compensation
The court properly started with the plain meaning and natu-
ral reading of the statutory and regulatory scheme.108 To be
sure, the text of the rule itself uses “exception” language.109 If
the FAA had intended for expense-sharing to be excluded from
the definition of compensation, it could have just as easily done
so.110 In fact, its predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
did just that: “that one or more passengers contribute to the
actual operating expenses of a flight is not considered the carriage of
persons for compensation or hire.”111 But the FAA chose not to
carry similar language into its current regulations.
Moreover, the court noted the FAA’s trend toward a broader
definition of “compensation.”112 While this conclusion could
have drawn Auer critics to assault the court’s deference to the
FAA’s interpretation of its own rule, the court correctly em-
braced this broader view of “compensation” and disposed of the
Auer question on procedural grounds.113 Because Flytenow did
not reach the Auer issue, critics instead aim their criticism to-
ward the FAA’s arguably broad interpretation of compensation
itself, rather than the court’s deference thereto.114
107 Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 889–90 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Even without
[Auer] deference, we have no difficulty upholding the FAA’s interpretation of its
regulations in this case.”) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997))
(Auer held that an agency’s interpretation of a term used in its rule controls un-
less such interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-
tion.”) (see infra notes 179–87 for further discussion of Auer).
108 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (explaining that statu-
tory, and thus regulatory, interpretation starts with the plain and natural reading
when viewed in context and in light of the larger scheme).
109 14 C.F.R. § 61.113(a) (2016) (“[e]xcept as provided in paragraphs (b)
through (h) . . . no person who holds a private pilot certificate may act as pilot in
command of an aircraft that is carrying passengers or property for compensation or
hire”) (emphasis added).
110 Cf. MacPherson, supra note 45, at 20.
111 Private Pilot Privileges, 15 Fed. Reg. 5226, 5226 (Aug. 12, 1950) (emphasis
added).
112 Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 891 (citing Haberkorn Interpretation,
supra note 83).
113 Cf. MacPherson, supra note 45, at 20–22; see infra text accompanying notes
179–87 for a full discussion on Auer.
114 See MacPherson, supra note 45, at 18–22.
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Rebecca MacPherson, who previously served as Assistant Chief
Counsel to the FAA, has been among the most vocal opponents
of Flytenow. She published a detailed critique of the FAA’s inter-
pretation, the court’s holding, and the worrisome implications
to the aviation law world.115 Specifically, MacPherson argues that
the FAA’s reading of § 61.113 as an exception over an exemp-
tion contravenes previous interpretations of the expense-sharing
provision.116 At the very least, she argues, the FAA has been si-
lent on the matter.117
Conspicuously missing from her argument is any mention of
several FAA Interpretations on that same topic, namely the
Lamb, Bunce, Bobertz, or Reich Interpretations.118 Each of
these Interpretations states in no uncertain terms that pro rata
expense-sharing is compensation.119 And each Interpretation
bolsters the FAA’s contention in Flytenow that § 61.113 is to be
read narrowly.
Admittedly, the factual circumstances of each of these previ-
ous Interpretations differ somewhat from Flytenow’s circum-
stances.120 And most of these Interpretations focus on common
purpose as opposed to the exemption-exception dichotomy.
However, that does not discount their discussion of the term
“compensation.” On the contrary, they demonstrate that the
FAA has consistently signaled to private pilots that the compen-
115 See id. at 17–18, 19–20.
116 Reich Interpretation, supra note 85, at 2 (“Regarding the definition of com-
pensation, the FAA has continually maintained a long[-]standing policy that de-
fines compensation in very broad terms. It does not require profit, a profit motive,
or the actual payment of funds.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
117 MacPherson, supra note 45, at 20 n.26.
118 See id. at 18–22.
119 See Lamb Interpretation, supra note 49, at 2 (stating “the FAA broadly de-
fines compensation, which includes reimbursement of operating expenses”);
Bunce Interpretation, supra note 49, at 1 (“Reimbursement for the pro rata share
of operating expenses constitutes compensation and would be considered a com-
mercial operation for which a part 119 certificate is required.”); Bobertz Inter-
pretation, supra note 49, at 2 (“pro rata share of operating expenses constitutes
compensation”); Reich Interpretation, supra note 85, at 2 (“compensation under
the FAA’s view is the receipt of anything of value”). Ironically, MacPherson au-
thored or at least signed several of those legal interpretations during her time at
the FAA.
120 The Lamb and Bunce Interpretations answer similar expense-sharing ques-
tions in a medical transportation setting. The Bobertz Interpretation arises out of
recreational plane-sharing to canoe sites, and the Reich Interpretation analyzed a
model akin to Flytenow’s model but in the not-for-profit situation. See Lamb In-
terpretation, supra note 49, at 1; Bunce Interpretation, supra note 49, at 1; Reich
Interpretation, supra note 85, at 1.
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sation restrictions set forth in § 61.113(a) are stronger than
ever.121 More importantly, the Interpretations demonstrate the
FAA’s signaling that how it interprets “compensation” does not
change from one set of factual circumstances to another. In fact,
it appears that the FAA does not plan to back down from such
restrictions, even in the modern technology-dependent era.122
2. Common Carriage
Flytenow focused most of its argument to the D.C. Circuit on
the issue of holding out.123 Albeit, the propriety of focusing on
application of the common carrier definition was questiona-
ble.124 But Flytenow did correctly recognize several inconsisten-
cies in the FAA’s past interpretations of the term.125 While
Flytenow did not dispute that its operation undoubtedly met ele-
ments (2) and (3) of the common carrier standard (i.e., trans-
portation of persons or property from place to place,
respectively), Flytenow reiterated its dispute with (4) compensa-
tion and hotly disputed the FAA’s application of (1) “holding
out.”126 In the past, the FAA has defined the standard for hold-
ing out as “communicat[ing] to the public, or a segment to the
public, that transportation services are indiscriminately available
to any person with whom contact is made.”127 Direct advertising
and large scale signs (e.g., billboards) certainly satisfy that defi-
nition.128 However, the FAA stopped short of defining the exact
contours of the test.
Not surprisingly, the FAA has struggled with applying its twen-
tieth century standard to modern, twenty-first century factual
circumstances.129 For example, the FAA previously determined
that posting flights on community college bulletin boards did
not qualify as “holding out.”130 The FAA reasoned that the post-
121 See, e.g., supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text.
123 Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 891–93 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
124 See infra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.
125 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief at *15, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882,
886 (D.C. Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 66004 (Jan. 5, 2015).
126 Id. at *22–23.
127 Haberkorn Interpretation, supra note 83, at 2 (citing Transocean Airlines,
Enforcement Proceeding, 11 C.A.B. 350, 350 (1950)).
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., MacPherson, supra note 45, at 20 n.26.
130 See Brief for the Respondent at *21 n.11, 30, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d
882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 1064063 (Mar. 11, 2015); Peti-
tioner’s Reply Brief at *13, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir.
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ing would be restrained in scope by virtue of its static location.
Potential passengers would come from a rather limited, identifi-
able class of viewers.131 In 2011, a request for legal interpreta-
tion asked the FAA to extend that bulletin board rationale to
the world’s modern bulletin board: Facebook.132 The FAA re-
sponded with a somewhat cryptic interpretation.133 Instead of
giving an answer, the FAA wrote that it did not have enough
information about the specific operation to make a determina-
tion. It did note, however, that “advancing technology allows
one to quickly reach a large audience through the electronic
communications and internet posts.”134 And the FAA stuck to
the definition on which it has relied for decades.135
While Flytenow attempted to capitalize on this ambiguity in its
appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the FAA and D.C. Circuit correctly
shut down that line of reasoning.136 Noting several important
considerations, the D.C. Court determined that a semi-public
website (e.g., Facebook or the Flytenow website) was distinguish-
able from the bulletin board scenario. First, the FAA and court
explained that something is not excluded from “holding out”
simply because it does not reach the entire general public.137 As
the Haberkorn Interpretation explains, “[posting on Facebook]
may still be considered holding out if it expresses a willingness
to provide transportation for all within this class or segment to the
extent of its capacity.”138 Second, the court further explained that
the manner of communication was not the determinative issue;
2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 1569752 (Apr. 8, 2015) (both discussing FAA Legal
Interpretation Letter from Kenneth Geier, Regional Counsel, to Paul Ware (Feb.
13, 1976) (“if you plan to go to St. Louis for the weekend, there would be noth-
ing wrong with your advertising on the school bulletin board for other students
to accompany you in order to defray your costs”)).
131 Brief for the Respondent at *21 n.11, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882,
886 (D.C. Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 1064063 (Mar. 11, 2015).
132 Haberkorn Interpretation, supra note 83, at 1.
133 See id. at 2.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief at *9, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882,
886 (D.C. Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 66004 (Jan. 5, 2015).
137 Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 892–93 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
138 Haberkorn Interpretation, supra note 83, at 2 (quoting FAA Legal interpre-
tation Letter from Donald P. Byrne, Acting Assistant Chief Counsel for Regula-
tions and Enforcement, to William A. Dempsay (June 5, 1990)) (emphasis in
original).
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rather, the FAA focuses on size of the potential viewer class.139
Third, while Flytenow argued that the website had a limited
viewing audience because the portal was “semi-private” and only
open to members, the court did not bite.140 In reality, member-
ship required “nothing more than signing up.”141 Therefore,
even if the FAA left some ambiguity after its Haberkorn Inter-
pretation, the “online bulletin board” in this case reached much
farther than a bulletin board or an individual’s Facebook ac-
count ever could.142 Fourth, Flytenow’s briefing conveniently
left out the whole definition of “common carrier” from the FAA
Circular.143 The standard explicitly states that “ . . . occasional
refusals to transport, are not conclusive proof that the carrier is
not a common carrier.”144 While Flytenow argued that pilots
could choose to accept or reject a flight for any reason or no
reason at all, that did not exclude the operation from the con-
tours of the FAA standard.145 Without a challenge to the FAA’s
definition of the term itself, the D.C. Court properly upheld the
only reasonable application of the “common carrier” standard—
Flytenow was a common carrier.
D. FLYTENOW’S FATAL FLAWS
While the FAA properly interpreted and applied the germane
regulations to the Flytenow business plan, Flytenow made sev-
eral litigation errors that prevented the chance of a more suc-
cessful appeal.146 First, Flytenow did not challenge FAA’s
definition of “common carriage” until its reply brief on ap-
139 Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 892; Brief for the Respondent in Opposition to the
Petition for Certiorari at *21–22, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL 69183 (U.S. Jan.
9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 6777193 (Nov. 14, 2016).
140 Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 892.
141 Id.
142 See id.
143 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief at *11, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882,
886 (D.C. Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 66004 (Jan. 5, 2015).
144 FAA Advisory Circular 120-12A (Apr. 26, 1986), ¶ 4, J.A. 30 (emphasis
added).
145 See id.
146 See Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 892–93 (D.C. Cir. 2015). While only
the failure to preserve a deference challenge is discussed in detail, the other flaws
should be noted. Flytenow wasted too much litigation capital by (1) attempting to
create a circuit split where none existed by toying with potential misrepresenta-
tions of the law; (2) not arguing the matter as one of first impression or other
pure law arguments; and (3) leaning too heavily on a flawed First Amendment
argument. See id.
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peal.147 Those watching the case anticipated that the case could
provide a vehicle to challenge Auer. So much so that the CATO
Institute, TechFreedom, the Southeastern Legal Foundation,
National Federation of Independent Business Small Business
Legal Center, the Buckeye Institute, and the Beacon Center of
Tennessee all filed amicus briefs in support of the petition for
writ of certiorari alone.148 However, any hope for a challenge
was not properly preserved.149 Generally, courts “will not enter-
tain arguments or claims raised for the first time in a reply
brief,” as doing so would not only be unfair to the appellee but
also risky for the court in issuing a less-than-fully-informed opin-
ion.150 Thus, Flytenow’s procedural mistake prevented what had
the potential to be an all-out administrative law battle.151
In its briefing in support of its petition for certiorari, Flytenow
asserted that it did not forfeit an “as written” challenge below
for two reasons. One, Flytenow denied that it failed to raise the
issue in its initial briefing to the court of appeals.152 Flytenow
quoted statements from its first brief to that court as support.153
However, the quotes were over-parsed and taken out of context.
147 See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at *2, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 886
(D.C. Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015 WL 1569752 (Apr. 8, 2015).
148 See Brief for The CATO Institute & TechFreedom as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL 69183 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No.
16-14) 2016 WL 4268635 (2016); Brief of Amici Curiae Southeastern Legal Foun-
dation, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal
Center, The Buckeye Institute, The Beacon Center of Tennessee, and Thomas P.
Gross in Support of Petitioner, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL 69183 (U.S. Jan. 9,
2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 4120701, at *1 (2016).
149 Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 892–93 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
150 Id. (quoting Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 84 F.3d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir.
1996)); see also McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharm., Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
151 See Brief for The CATO Institute & TechFreedom as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL 69183 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No.
16-14) 2016 WL 4268635, at *3 (2016).
152 Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *5,
Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL 69183 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL
6994879 (Nov. 23, 2016).
153 Id. Flytenow, in its reply brief in support of the petition for certiorari at
Supreme Court level, quoted its original brief to the D.C. Circuit: “Since the FAA
has interpreted only common law terms here, and because the FAA has radically
departed from previous interpretations and precedent, the MacPherson-Winton Inter-
pretation is entitled to no deference by this Court.”; “Here, the key terms that the
FAA had to interpret and apply to Flytenow’s facts [including ‘common car-
riage’] are, by the FAA’s own admission, all common law terms.”; “ ‘[C]ommon car-
riage’ as opposed to private carriage . . . [is a] purely common law term[ ].” Id.
(citations omitted) (emphasis and alterations in original).
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Two, Flytenow asserted that it should have been obvious that it
was attempting to challenge the FAA’s common carriage stan-
dard. In reality, Flytenow and its initial brief only challenged the
interpretation of the standard (i.e., the AirPooler and Flytenow
Interpretations)154 rather than the standard itself.155 Although
Flytenow explicitly argued that the court of appeals should give
less deference to the AirPooler and Flytenow Interpretations, its
opening brief to that court said nothing about deference that
should be afforded to the standards for “compensation” or
“common carriage” used therein.156 Thus, the D.C. Circuit cor-
rectly determined that a challenge to the interpretation of those
terms was forfeited. Rather, the court properly limited its review
to application of “compensation” and “common carriage” in the
AirPooler and Flytenow Interpretations.
For common carriage, the D.C. Circuit merely had to ex-
amine the FAA’s application of the four prongs of the common
carriage test. Flytenow’s model quite clearly satisfied two of the
four elements of the standard outlined in the Circular. Compen-
sation and holding out were the only elements that even ap-
peared questionable. And both were previously answered.157
Had Flytenow raised the issue in a timely manner, the D.C.
Circuit would have been forced to opine on the applicability of
Auer and determine the degree of deference an agency is given
when interpreting a largely common law term (i.e., common
carriage).158 Instead, the opinion only briefly mentioned defer-
ence, discussing two points: (1) “[e]ven without such deference,
we have no difficulty upholding the FAA’s interpretation of its
regulations in this case”159; and (2) it would “not consider Flyte-
now’s argument that the FAA’s decision contravenes the com-
mon law. That argument is forfeited.”160
154 Flytenow refers to the two interpretations collectively in its brief to the D.C.
Circuit as the “Macpherson-Winton Interpretation.” Petitioner’s Opening Brief at
*1, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2015) No. 14-1168, 2015
WL 66004 (Jan. 5, 2015).
155 Id. at *16.
156 See id.
157 Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 890–92 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
158 Albeit, the analysis infra suggests that the outcome would have been no
different regardless of which level of agency deference applied.
159 Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 890.
160 Id. at 893.
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III. FLYTENOW AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEFERENCE
Even if the D.C. Court would have reached a deference ques-
tion, the decision likely would not have changed regardless of
what deference standard applied.161 The Supreme Court has
consistently recognized that different situations require differ-
ing degrees of deference.162 In the late twentieth century, the
Supreme Court decided a number of landmark decisions that
caused great controversy regarding the amount of deference to-
ward agencies.163 And, while the Court has since tried to clarify
the scope and extent of each doctrine,164 observers still worry
that the Court has created great uncertainty165 and greatly en-
hanced agency power.166 Many worry—perhaps justifiably—that
the varying degrees of deference have effectively given adminis-
trative agencies the ability to act beyond their authority as exec-
utors and into the realms of legislators and arbitrators.167
A. FLYTENOW AND CHEVRON
The most well-established of the doctrines is Chevron defer-
ence.168 Under Chevron, when Congress has “explicitly left a gap
for an agency to fill,” Congress is presumed to have delegated
161 But see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *18–19, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA,
2017 WL 69183 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 3564280 (June 24,
2016) (advocating for lesser deference under cases discussed infra note 189).
162 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 220 (2001) (recognizing “vari-
ous justifications for deference depending on statutory circumstances and agency
action”) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) for the quoted
proposition).
163 See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (both discussing the degree of
deference afforded to agency interpretation; both resulting in much controversy,
especially recently under the Bush and Obama Administrations).
164 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27 (attempting to define the contours of
Chevron).
165 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2005) (arguing Mead not only failed
but also made matters worse).
166 See Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Law-
making Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 188 (1992) (discussing tension
and confusion among agencies and courts based on changing role of each actor
in recent administrative law developments).
167 See, e.g., id.; Charles A. Breer & Scot W. Anderson, Regulation Without
Rulemaking: The Force and Authority of Informal Agency Action, Proceedings of
47th Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute (2001) (discussing rise of the
informal rulemaking phenomenon among agencies and its apparent conflict
with the Administrative Procedure Act).
168 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (discussing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44).
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the authority to fill that gap to that agency.169 Furthermore, the
resulting regulation is “binding in the courts unless procedurally
defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly con-
trary to the statute.”170 When a reviewing court examines an
agency’s interpretation of a statute, the Chevron two-step test ap-
plies.171 Under that framework, courts ask “[1] whether the stat-
ute is ambiguous and, if so, [2] whether the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable.”172 The Chevron two-step “is pre-
mised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an im-
plicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the
statutory gaps.”173 Here, Congress left the FAA a gap to fill in
§ 40102(a)(25) of the Federal Aviation Act by purposefully leav-
ing the phrase “common carrier” undefined.174 Indeed, for de-
cades, the FAA has relied on the same definition with no dissent
from Congress.175 Certainly the FAA, charged with
“promot[ing] safe flight of civil aircraft,”176 is best suited to de-
fine “common carrier” in the context of its own regulations.177
Thus, a true Chevron issue was not presented here. The FAA
spotted a gap in the Federal Aviation Act and determined that
“guidelines giving general explanation” of common carrier
“would be helpful.”178 Since Chevron, however, the Court’s defer-
ence jurisprudence has spiraled into a set of complex and inter-
related doctrines.
B. INTRODUCTION TO AUER
Of these cases, Auer v. Robbins is by far the most controver-
sial.179 Before determining if Flytenow would have qualified for
169 Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44).
170 Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
171 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
172 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842–43).
173 Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159
(2000)).
174 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(25) (2012) (“the transportation
of passengers or property by aircraft as a common carrier for compensation . . .”)
(emphasis added).
175 See FAA Advisory Circular 120-12A (Apr. 26, 1986), J.A. 30–32.
176 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (2012).
177 See id. § 40102(a)(25).
178 Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting FAA
Advisory Circular 120-12A (Apr. 26, 1986), ¶ 3, J.A. 30).
179 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see also Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (citing concerns with Auer defer-
ence); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency In-
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Auer deference, introductions are in order. Under Auer, a court
generally must accept an agency’s interpretation of its own regu-
lations as controlling unless that interpretation is plainly errone-
ous or inconsistent with the regulation.180 Critics argue the
Court went too far with this standard, and the cases that fol-
lowed have yielded much concern and criticism. Even the late
Justice Scalia expressed skepticism with Auer in Talk America, Inc.
v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.181 Specifically, Justice Scalia warned
of the implications of the line of deferential cases, taking partic-
ular concern with the “validity” of Auer.182 He wrote that “defer-
ring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages the
agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future
adjudications, to do what it pleases.”183
Justice Scalia and others who criticize Auer are, at least empiri-
cally, somewhat justified in their concern.184 A recent study ex-
amined judicial review of administrative decisions and found
that when Auer deference (also known as Seminole Rock defer-
ence) was applied, courts upheld agency action 90.9% of the
time.185 On the other hand, perhaps some of that concern is
merely hype, as courts only apply such strong deference in 7.1%
of eligible cases.186 But perhaps those concerns are exacerbated
by the lack of uncertainty in when a case will get a certain level
of deference.187 To be sure, under Auer and progeny, “the Su-
preme Court’s deference doctrine is complicated as a matter of
theory and chaotic as a matter of practice. . . . In short, the Su-
preme Court’s deference jurisprudence is a mess.”188
terpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 617 (1996) (laying out the
constitutional concerns with increased deference to agency actions).
180 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
181 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68–69 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
184 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan,
96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098–1104 (2008).
185 Id. at 1103–05.
186 See id. at 1103–04 (calling judicial application of Auer-Seminole Rock defer-
ence “episodically invoked” and “sporadic”).
187 Id. at 1156–57.
188 Id.
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C. PREDICTION IF FLYTENOW HAD PRESERVED THE DEFERENCE
QUESTION
In its reply brief to the D.C. Circuit and its certiorari petition
to the Supreme Court, Flytenow argued that if the courts en-
gaged in a deference analysis and gave any deference to the
FAA, Auer deference would have been the improper standard.189
Instead, Flytenow cited the Court’s administrative deference de-
cisions in Christopher, Mead, and Christensen for what it believed
were the “proper” standards in a deference analysis.190 Specifi-
cally, Flytenow argued that each of these standards alone or
taken together stand for the proposition that the Supreme
Court has recently expressed a preference to limit agency defer-
ence. Thus, under Flytenow’s line of reasoning, the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s decision flies in the face of this deference-limiting
trend.191 However, none of those cited decisions would have ap-
plied or changed the result of Flytenow even if either the D.C.
Circuit or Supreme Court would have engaged in a deference
analysis of the FAA’s interpretation.
First, Christopher was an extreme case (likely fact-limited) in
which the Court refused to give high agency deference when the
potential result was retrospective crushing liability based on con-
duct that occurred well before the Department of Labor issued
an adverse interpretation.192 Flytenow is clearly distinguishable,
as the FAA’s interpretative letter did not impose any retrospec-
tive liability on Flytenow, much less crushing liability. In fact, the
FAA merely told Flytenow that its current operation violated reg-
ulations, with no attendant liability or retroactive effects. There-
fore, the Court likely would not have applied far less deferential
and far more stringent Christopher standard.193
189 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *10, *15–16, *18–19, Flytenow,
Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL 69183 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 3564280
(June 24, 2016).
190 Id. at *18–19; Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156,
2167 (2012) (discussing the “strong reasons” based on the facts of that case for
not applying Auer deference); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232–34
(2001) (stating that interpretative rules get lower deference); Christensen v. Har-
ris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such as those in opinion let-
ters . . . do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”).
191 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *18–19, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL
69183 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 3564280 (June 24, 2016).
192 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168–69 (refusing to opine on “the general merits
of Auer deference”).
193 See AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 4.
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Second, Mead and Christensen deal with an agency stepping
outside congressionally delegated authority.194 For example,
Mead, dealt with the authority of the United States Customs Ser-
vice to issue an interpretation with legally binding force.195
Thus, even if Mead did apply, Flytenow would still have lost the
battle. And the sole proposition that Flytenow cherry-picked
from Mead misstates the relevant holding.196 The interpretative
letters that Flytenow referenced in its Mead summary were char-
acterizations of cargo that were never intended to have legal ef-
fect under Customs’ grant of statutory authority.197 By contrast,
there was no question here that the FAA was acting within its
statutory grant.198 Further, if either court did utilize the Mead
deference, it would defer to the FAA’s interpretation propor-
tionally, based on “thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade.”199 Here, the FAA acted in conformity with past sig-
naling that (1) it considered § 61.113 expense-sharing an excep-
tion, not an exemption; and (2) that it would continue to
construe holding out broadly, even in the technology era.200
Thus, under the Mead standard, the FAA’s interpretation also
passes muster.
Finally, the Court, if it granted the petition to review the def-
erence question, would have had no trouble affirming without
194 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586–88; Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.
195 Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 (stating “[t]he authorization for classification rulings,
and Customs’s practice in making them, present a case far removed not only
from notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably
suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the
deference claimed for them here.”).
196 Id. at 226–27 (holding “administrative implementation of a particular statu-
tory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress dele-
gated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority”).
197 See id.
198 See Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 44701, 44703, 44705 (2012); see also
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *19, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 2017 WL 69183
(U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 3564280 (June 24, 2016) (arguing that
the FAA applied the wrong definition of a common-law term, not that the FAA
acted outside its statutory grant).
199 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
200 See supra notes 118–22; 134–45 and accompanying text.
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Auer.201 The common carrier definition in the Advisory Circular
noted the common-law heritage of the term202 and attempted to
conform its standard thereto. And the FAA successfully did so.
“Holding out,” the essential prong on which the FAA and D.C.
Circuit rested their decisions, is axiomatically part of the “com-
mon carrier” definition.203 In fact, Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“carrier” as a “commercial enterprise that holds itself out to the
public as offering to transport freight or passengers for a fee.”204
Certainly, common carriage has a “broad range of possibly ap-
plicable definitions”205 and perhaps the Court could have found
that the FAA’s definition did not deserve the same degree of
deference as a narrower common law definition. When courts
examine an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, they
generally apply either heightened Auer deference or lesser Skid-
more deference.206 Here, a court applying Auer could easily find
that the common carrier standard applied by the FAA is not
“plainly erroneous,” as the FAA would argue that it was merely
interpreting an ambiguous term within its own regulations.207
However, even under the lesser Skidmore deference, the FAA’s
standard would rule the day. Under Skidmore, the FAA’s inter-
pretation would only be given deference if the regulation in
question were ambiguous.208 When Skidmore deference applies
to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, such an in-
terpretation is “entitled to respect,” the weight of which de-
pends on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to per-
suade, if lacking power to control.”209 Here, assuming (arguendo)
that “common carrier” in the FAA’s regulations is ambiguous,
201 See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at *13, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA,
2017 WL 69183 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-14), 2016 WL 3564280 (Nov. 14,
2016).
202 See FAA Advisory Circular 120-12A (Apr. 26, 1986), J.A. 30–32.
203 CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (“whatever the particular test, some type of holding out to the public is
the sine qua non of the act of ‘provid[ing]’ ‘transportation of passengers or prop-
erty by aircraft as a common carrier’”) (emphasis added).
204 Carrier, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
205 Voyager 1000 v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 489 F.2d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 1973)
(for the quote, not the proposition).
206 See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
207 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
208 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.
209 Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (emphasis added); Gonza-
les v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006).
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the FAA’s interpretation comports not only with its own histori-
cal practice but also with modern common law practice.210 In-
deed, the FAA’s interpretation here is “based upon more
specialized experience and broader investigations and informa-
tion than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case.”211
Accordingly, like it or not, the FAA’s interpretation quite clearly
did not “amount[ ] to a transfer of the judge’s exercise of inter-
pretive judgment to the agency” and would have held up under
even the lower deferenial standards.212
Therefore, regardless of the deference that could have ap-
plied, the outcome in Flytenow would have likely been the same.
However, because Flytenow merely attempted a challenge of the
FAA’s applications of “common carrier” to its set of facts,
neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Supreme Court had occasion to
fully flesh out an administrative deference analysis.
IV. FLYTENOW IMPLICATIONS: REGULATION IN THE
SHARING ECONOMY
Flytenow, while correctly decided under current law, demon-
strates a larger problem with regulations and with persons and
agencies charged to regulate: an inability to adapt to a changing
economy that has harmed both private industry and consum-
ers.213 The world economy continues to shift more and more
toward the “sharing economy.”214 Since the early twenty-first
century, legal and economic commentators have struggled with
how to tackle the unique problems posed by regulating share-
able goods and services.215
Much debate has centered on the best way to regulate the
sharing economy to encourage innovation and ingenuity with-
210 See, e.g., CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 415
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
211 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
212 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1219 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
213 See Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 885–93 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
214 The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), http://
www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-shar-
ing-economy (discussing the role of the recession in the emergence of the shar-
ing economy).
215 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence
of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004) (providing
an early commentary in 2004 on the emergence of social and economic issues
unique to the “shareable good”).
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out sacrificing safety and consumer protection.216 On one side
of the debate, some legal commentators advocate for a hands-off
approach.217 They generally maintain that low involvement and
minimal agency oversight promotes market self-correction, thus
self-regulation.218 On the other side, legal commentators argue
that regulation is not, of itself, stifling. Rather, regulators must
adapt to and ultimately embrace this new economic model.219
Indeed, commentators on this side of the divide advocate for a
complete overhaul of existing statutory and regulatory
framework.220
Ironically, those consumers who the FAA and other agencies
try to protect with current regulations are the very people being
harmed by them.221 While start-up companies have enjoyed this
wave of sharing, consumers have largely benefitted as well.222
Those observers who see the economic and legal benefits of
wait-and-see regulation, such as Christopher Koopman, argue
that the shift to a sharing economy has: increased overall value,
allowed new entrants to take advantage of “dead capital” such as
empty space in cars (or planes), mitigated traditional consumer
problems of information asymmetry and transaction costs be-
tween producers and end consumers, and fostered boundless in-
novation with hyper-specialization.223 And many of these effects
shine directly on consumers, in contrast to traditional slow-mov-
216 See Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection
Regulation the Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 530
(2015).
217 Alamea Deedee Bitran, The Uber Innovations That Lyfted Our Standards Out of
Thin Air(bnb), Because Now, “There’s an App for That”, 8 ELON L. REV. 503, 504–08
(2016) (discussing the rapid rise and tense protest of the sharing economy; advo-
cating for hands-off self-regulation).
218 See, e.g., Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in
the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 116–17 (2015)
(arguing self-regulation and market correction over formal rules).
219 See, e.g., Sofia Ranchorda´s, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation
in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 475 (2015) (advocating
“limited, but specific, regulation of the sharing economy,” focusing on the need
for regulation in the areas of “compulsory contracts between parties, compensa-
tion, minimum skill requirements, and rules on liability”).
220 Andrea Bolton, Regulating Ride-Share Apps: A Study on Tailored Reregulation
Regarding Transportation Network Companies, Benefitting Both Consumers and Drivers,
46 CUMB. L. REV. 137, 138 (2016) (arguing for legislative action to handle
problems posed by sharing the economy).
221 Koopman et al., supra note 215, at 532–38.
222 Id. at 531–32.
223 Id.
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ing supply and demand models that take time before benefitting
consumers, if at all.
If done hastily and sloppily, or slowly and aloofly, regulation
in the sharing economy could have crippling effects like higher
entry barriers and liability risks.224 Over-regulation in the bur-
geoning field has also produced an interesting counterproduc-
tive effect of uniformity among companies.225 Because these
start-ups thrive on innovation and pushing traditional bounda-
ries, the negative effects of uniformity, like higher prices, less
competition, and stifled innovation, affect sharing economy
companies within this new sector at a visceral level.226 While the
virtues of regulation are up for debate, and indeed often are
debated, there is much less debate on the pressing inability for
the current regulatory framework to keep up with the changing
economy.227 And, as Koopman argues, this dissonance is trick-
ling down to consumers in an alarming way.228
For air technology companies, these forewarned effects have
become obvious and immediate.229 Flight-sharing companies
cannot operate under the Flytenow business model, unless (1)
the FAA changes its interpretation of an operative term (like
“common carrier”); (2) the FAA changes its rules through Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act notice and comment procedures; or
(3) the companies change course midflight and require pilots to
obtain the additional commercial certification.230 Seemingly the
FAA left open the possibility that companies like Flytenow could
cure the “holding out” defect by limiting membership to an
even narrower class of identifiable persons.231 This is the very
ambiguous and hasty regulation that Koopman cautions may ul-
timately lead to negative consumer outcomes.232
Adding more regulatory confusion to the mix, Flytenow creates
“the bulletin board paradox.” Flytenow did not prohibit private
pilots and non-commercial operations from posting upcoming
flights on a bulletin board at local airport or public place. Pilots
224 Id. at 537.
225 Id. at 537–39.
226 See id.
227 See id. at 532.
228 See id.
229 See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 71.
230 See, e.g., MacPherson, supra note 45, at 20–21 (discussing possible implica-
tions stemming from Flytenow, focusing specifically on the effect to aviation start-
ups).
231 See AirPooler Interpretation, supra note 5, at 4.
232 See Koopman et al., supra note 215, at 532–39, 544–45.
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who wish to solicit a limited and identifiable class of passengers
to travel along with them and offset costs apparently retain the
ability to do so, even under Flytenow. So long as the passengers
share a “common purpose” with the pilot (and that purpose is
not just to transport the passenger to the destination) then the
pilot would still be under his or her private license. If, however,
someone took a picture of that bulletin board and posted it on
Facebook, it could become holding out. Thus, exposure based
on number of “friends” has now become the test for holding
out. While this result is a logical extension of the FAA’s prior
interpretations to new circumstances,233 the bulletin board para-
dox demonstrates the logical holes in the FAA’s reasoning. Flyte-
now begs the question as to how can the FAA continue to rely on
such antiquated notions of communication and aviation in this
world of technology and sharing.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the D.C. Circuit made the right call in Flytenow, the
result is a mismatch of regulations that have no place governing
modern circumstances. Even if the D.C. Circuit would have
reached the deference issue, under thirty years of Supreme
Court precedent, the crazy house of administrative law mirrors
remains highly disjunctive and perhaps too deferential under
Auer. Only Congress or the agencies themselves can cure the
problem. At a time where a whole new set of regulations will be
necessary to come remotely close to keeping up with changes in
technology and economy, the judiciary has effectively tied its
own hands. The implications for aviation start-ups are obvious.
The concerns of other start-ups are looming.
Most alarming and far-reaching, however, Flytenow signals an
inability of regulators to keep up with rapid innovation. For ex-
ample, Uber has recently become the subject of similar legal de-
bate regarding its status as a potential common carrier.234
233 See, e.g., Haberkorn Interpretation, supra note 83, at 2.
234 See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Is Uber a Common Carrier?, 12 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 135 (2015) (discussing the nuances of common carrier status as they
relate to Uber and sharing economy); Riebana Sachs, The Common Carrier Barrier:
An Analysis of Standard of Care Requirements, Insurance Policies, and Liability Regula-
tions for Ride-Sharing Companies, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 873 (2016) (discussing legal
implications if ride-sharing acts were held to common carrier duties of care and
advocating against that possibility); Talia G. Loucks, Travelers Beware: Tort Liability
in the Sharing Economy, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 329 (2015) (discussing
problems with the sharing economy under current common-law duties and re-
sulting liability).
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Though mostly theoretical before, heightened liability could be-
come a reality for ride-sharing companies under the Flytenow de-
cision.235 Uber should especially take note, as it has announced
plans to enter the aviation and private aircraft space, recently
completing a deal with AirBus to carry out the design and imple-
mentation.236 It may be years before this plan takes off. None-
theless, Flytenow should alert observers that the FAA (1) is still
relying on thirty-year-old definitions in their foundational stan-
dards; and (2) may not be ready or willing to regulate such a
drastic shift in consumer air travel. Time will tell. But for now,
“sharing the skies” floats as a pipe dream of decades past.
235 See Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
236 Fast-Forwarding to a Future of On-Demand Urban Air Transportation, UBER ELE-
VATE (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.uber.com/elevate.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3NWY-2W8V]; Rebecca Blumenstein & Natalia Drozdiak, Airbus to Join Forces With
Uber for On-Demand Helicopter Service, CEO Says, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2016), https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/airbus-to-join-forces-with-uber-for-on-demand-helicopter-
service-ceo-says-1453048668.
